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Where's the Sunshine? Inadequacy of
Pennsylvania's Open Meeting Law
A popular Government, without popular information, or
the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a
tragedy; or, perhaps, both. Knowledge will forever govern igno-
rance; and a people who mean to be their own governors must
arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.'
I. History and Philosophy of Sunshine Laws
A. Common-Law and Statutory History of Open Meetings and the
Right to Know
The above statement, which has been echoed in many comments,2 is
the best expression of the need for open government. The common-law
history of this concept has been argued as a constitutionally guaranteed
"right to know." 3 State legislatures have concurred with President Madi-
son's maxim, for they have unanimously adopted legislation requiring
that certain meetings be open to the public. 4 On the federal level,
1. 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 276 (1865) (letter to W.T.
Barry, August 4, 1822) (emphasis added).
2. Recchie & Chernoski, Government in the Sunshine: Open Meeting Legislation in
Ohio, 37 OHIO ST_ L.J. 497 n.1 (1976); Comment, Freedom of Information in Arizona: An
Antidote for Secrecy in Government, 1975 ARIZ. Sr. L.J. 111; Note, Open Meeting Statutes:
The Press Fights for the "Right to Know, " 75 H.sitv. L. REV. 1199, 1200 n. 10 (1%2).
3. For two excellent histories of the common-law right to open meetings, see H.
CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW: LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS AND PROCEED-
INGS, 180-82 (1953); Note, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199, supra note 2, at 1203-04.
4. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 393 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310 (1976); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 38-431 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2801 (1968); CAL. Gov. CODE § 11120 (West
Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-9-101 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21 (West
Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 29, § 10001 (Supp. 1977); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 1-1505 (West
Supp. 1977-78); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (West 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3301 (1975);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 92.1 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 67-2340 (Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN, STAT.
ch. 102, § 41 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1-I (Burns 1974); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 28A.1 (West Supp. 1977-78); KAN. STAT. § 75-4317 (Supp. 1975); KY. REV. STAT. §
61.805 (1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:4.1 (West Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 1, § 401
(1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 14 (1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, §IIB (Supp.
1977-78); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 4.1800 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.705 (West 1977); MIss.
CODE ANN. § 2541-1 (Supp. 1976); Mo. REV. STAT. § 610.010 (Supp. 1977); MONT. REV,
CODE ANN. § 82-3402 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1401 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT. §
241.010 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:! (Supp. 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-6
(West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-6-23 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 95 (McKinney
Supp. 1976-77); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.1 (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19 (Supp.
1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.22 (Baldwin 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 301 (West
Supp. 1977-78); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.610 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 261 (Purdon
Supp. 1977-78); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-46-1 (1977); S.C. CODE § 1-20 (Supp. 1975); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 1-25-1 (1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4401 (Supp. 1977); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-1 (Supp. 1977);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312 (Supp. 1976); VA. CODE § 2.1-340 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV.
Congress has enacted both right to know 5 and open meetings 6 laws.
Moreover, these statutes have consistently withstood constitutional at-
tacks premised on their purported vagueness.
7
Case law, 8 legislative floor debate, 9 and commentators' have pro-
pounded diverse justifications for open government. II A 1976 Pennsylva-
nia Commonwealth Court decision espoused a number of public and
official advantages found in open meeting government. 12 Sunshine laws
curtail government officials' misbehavior, 13 provide for a more educated
public through more accurate media reports of government activities,14
and disclose to public scrutiny decisions that result in expenditure of
public funds.' 5 The government derives advantages from open meetings
because public officials receive more accurate information on the is-
sues, 16 the officials can better gauge public reaction,' 7 and the open
meetings foster more public faith in government.' 8
There is, however, legitimate concern that government may become
too open. 19 Discussion concerning employees' reputations, 20 labor
CODE ANN. § 42.30.010 (1972); W. VA. CODE § 6-9A-1 (Supp. 1977); Wisc. STAT. ANN. §
19.82 (West Supp. 1977-78); Wyo. STAT. § 9-692.10 (Supp. 1975).
Alabama enacted the first open meeting (right to know) statute in the United States in
1915. ALA. CODE tit. 14, §§ 393-94 (1958). The popular title "Sunshine Law" originated
when the Florida legislature passed its version in 1967. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011 (West
1974).
5. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 522 (West 1977).
6. Sunshine Act of 1976, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b (West 1977).
7. Board of Pub. Instr. v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 697-99 (Fla. 1969); Raton Pub. Serv.
Co. v. Hobbes, 76 N.M. 535, 541-43, 417 P.2d 32, 36-37 (1966). See also Comment, Open
Meeting Laws in Michigan, 53 J. URB. L. 532, 551-54 (1976).
8. Consumers Educ. & Pro. Ass'n v. Nolan, 470 Pa. 372, 386, 368 A.2d 675, 682-83
(1977); Paterra v. Charleroi Area School Dist., 55 Wash. 115, 117 (Pa. C.P.), denial of relief
aff'd and dismissal of complaint on the merits vacated, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 451, 349 A.2d
813 (1975). Although the Paterra court's decision was vacated by the commonwealth court,
its analysis of the justifications for open government is sound.
9. 1973 PA. H.R.J. 1918 (remarks of Representative Shane); 1974 PA. SEN. J. 2096-97
(remarks of Senator Nolan); id. at 2098 (remarks of Senator Duffield).
10. Note, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199, supra note 2, at 1201.
II. For an interesting policy argument in favor of open meetings, see Brief for
Appellant at 8-1l, Judge v. Pocius, 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 139, 367 A.2d 788 (1977).
12. In re Emmanuel Baptist Church, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 427, 432-33, 364 A.2d 536,
539 (1976) (citing Kalil, Florida Sunshine Law, 49 FLA. B.J. 72 (1975)).
13. Id. See also Warren, Governmental Secrecy: Corruption's Ally, 60 A.B.A.J. 550
(1974).
14. In re Emmanuel Baptist Church, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 427, 433, 364 A.2d 536, 539
(1976). See also Wickham, Let the Sun Shine In! Open-Meeting Legislation can be our Key to
Closed Doors in State and Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 480, 481 (1973).
15. In re Emmanuel Baptist Church, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 427, 433,364 A.2d 536, 539
(1976).
16. Id.
17. Id. See also Markham, Sunshine on the Administrative Process: Wherein Lies the
Shade?, 28 AD. L. REV. 463, 468 (1976).
18. In re Emmanuel Baptist Church, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 427, 433, 364 A.2d 536, 539
(1976). See also Wickham, supra note 14, at 4%; Comment, Open Meetings Laws: An
Analysis and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151, 1161 (1974).
19. Markham, supra note 17; Wickham, supra note 14, at 481-82; Note, 75 HARV. L.
REV. 1199, supra note 2, at 1202.
20. See notes 107-11 and accompanying text infra.
negotiations, 21 and economic transactions 22 should be legislatively ex-
cluded from the coverage of open meeting laws. One court has expressed
concern that overly strict demands of openness would "throttle the...
members of the board and make it virtually impossible for them [to
function]. "23 Another court noted the legislative desire to restrict the
application of an open government law to prevent undue interference and
obstruction. 24 State Senator Coopersmith of Pennsylvania has remarked,
"[Y]ou have to run orderly government and certain things cannot be done
in public." 25 His colleague Senator Hill agreed and set forth three
benefits found in closed meetings: "[Ylou get a better discussion. . . , a
more uninhibited flow of ideas, a more to-the-point characterization of
the testimony than you would if the deliberation on the decision is open,
when people speak more guardedly and less to the point sometimes." 26
Therefore, there must be a compromise that can "devise a legal
standard affording the fullest possible degree of openness while recogniz-
ing the interests promoted by governmental secrecy." '27 The need for
such a balance is difficult to dispute, but perhaps even more difficult to
achieve. 28 It requires a combination of the best efforts at drafting rea-
sonable language by the legislature and a liberal interpretation by the
courts to promote the public's access to information without unduly
interfering with the free flow of ideas among their representatives. 29
B. Act 175 of 1974-The Pennsylvania Sunshine Law30
Before Pennsylvania's enactment of the 1957 Right to Know and
Open Meeting Laws, 3 "the right of a citizen to the examination and
21. See notes 112-14 and accompanying text infra.
22. See notes 115-16 and accompanying text infra.
Other areas of confidentiality are security matters, supervening laws, quasi-judicial
agencies, and legislative affairs. See notes 117-39 and accompanying text infra.
23. Paterra v. Charleroi Area School Dist., 55 Wash. 115, 124 (Pa. C.P. 1975).
24. Mooney v. Board of Trustees, 448 Pa. 424, 428 n.8, 292 A.2d 395, 397 n.8 (1972).
25. 1974 PA. SEN. J. 2096.
26. Id. at 2099.
27. Not e, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199, supra note 2, at 1203.
28. See Wickham, supra note 14, at 490; Comment, Public Sector Collective Bargain-
ing and Sunshine Laws-A Needless Conflict, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 159 (1976).
29. Amicus Curiae Brief for Appellant, Judge v. Pocius, 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 139, 367
A.2d 788 (1977) (submitted by Pennsylvania Attorney General).
Arguments have also been propounded against letting the cries of "timid government
officials and those who prefer the backroom to a public forum" sway the courts. Markham,
supra note 17, at 482. "If the board or agency feels aggrieved, then the remedy lies in the
halls of the Legislature and not in efforts to circumvent the plain provisions of the statute by
devious ways in the hope that the judiciary will read some exception into the law." Canney
v. Board of Pub. Inst., 278 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1973). This remark of the Florida Supreme
Court was adopted in Pennsylvania in In re Emmanuel Baptist Church, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct.
427, 435, 364 A.2d 536, 540 (1976).
30. Open Meeting Law, Act of July 19, 1974, P.L. 486, No. 175 (codified at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 65, §§ 261-269 (Purdon Supp. 1977) as amended by Act of February 4, 1976, P.L.
24, No. I1) [hereinafter cited as Pennsylvania Sunshine Law].
31. Right to Know Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 66.1-66.4 (Purdon 1959 & Supp.
1977); Open Meetings Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 251-254 (Purdon 1959). For an
excellent development of the history and application of the Pennsylvania Right to Know
Law, see Comment, The Pennsylvania Right to Know Statute: A Creature of the Legislature
Shaped by the Judiciary, 82 DICK. L. REV. 749 (1978).
inspection of public records was the subject of some confusion."
32
Notwithstanding specific legislation requiring that certain records and
meetings be made public, 33 a citizen's right to attend governmental
meetings was also uncertain.
34
To further clarify and expand this right, the Pennsylvania legislature
enacted the Pennsylvania Sunshine Law in 1974.35 Representative James
Knepper, the prime sponsor of the bill, 36 remarked on the floor of the
House of Representatives, "[The 1957 General Assembly] thought the
1957 version was better than its predecessor. But times change. Govern-
ment processes change. Public interest, awareness and demands for theirrights have increased since 1957. '-1 7 Comparing his bill to its predeces-
sor, Representative Knepper proclaimed that the bill "does have more
teeth and a more logical restraint on secret or closed government than
does the present law.''38 Unfortunately, Representative Knepper's im-
provement over the 1957 law had its teeth pulled by overly strict judicial
construction of its language and a judicial policy that ignores the legisla-
tive intent.
39
II. Judicial Interpretation of Sunshine Statutes
A. Wariness and Dissatisfaction
The suggestion of a dozen amendments to existing law by various
commentators 40 reflects a national dissatisfaction with current judicial
implementation of the sunshine concept. One scholar warns that courts
cannot too literally construe an act that deals with such a broad concept as
open meetings because language cannot capture exactly what the legisla-
ture is trying to express. 4' Admonitions about the need for sound judicial
32. Wiley v. Woods, 393 Pa. 341, 349, 141 A.2d 844, 848 (1958). See also Mooney v.
Board of Trustees, 448 Pa. 424, 429-30, n.10, 292 A.2d 395, 398 n.10 (1972).
33. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 276 (Purdon 1962) (recodified at PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 4-408); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 3145 (Purdon 1963) (repealed 1947).
34. Comment, Pennsylvania's "Sunshine Law": Problems of Construction and En-
forcement, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 536, 537 (1975).
35. See note 30 supra.
36. Pa. H. 124, Session of 1973.
37. 1973 PA. H.R.J. 2151.
38. Id.
39. See notes 226 & 230-35 and accompanying text infra.
40. Mathew, Government in the Sunshine: Judicial Application and Suggestions for
Reform, 2 FLA ST. U.L. REV. 537, 550-57 (1974); Tacha, The Kansas Open Meeting Act:
Sunshine on the Sunflower State?, 25 KAN. L. REV. 169, 205-13 (1977); Wickham, supra
note 14, at 499-501; Wickham, Tennessee's Sunshine Law: A Need for Limited Shade and
Clearer Focus, 42 TENN. L. REV. 557, 570-72 (1975); Note, Public Access to Governmental
Records and Meetings in Arizona, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 891, 917-19 (1974); Comment, 1975
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 111, supra note 2, at 125-33; Comment, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151, supra note 18, at
1185-90; Comment, Ambiguities in Oregon's Open Meeting Legislation, 53 ORE. L. REV.
339, 352-53 (1974); Comment, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 536, supra note 34, at 560; Comment,
Open Meetings in Virginia: Fortifying the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, 8 U. RIcH.
L. REV. 261, 272-75 (1974); Comment, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 159, supra note 28, at 178-
80; 49 TEX. L. REV. 764, 776-80 (1971).
41. Lawrence, Interpreting North Carolina's Open-Meetings Law, 54 N.C. L. REV.
777, 778-79 (1976). See also U. Mich. News, No. 38 (Feb. 16, 1977) at I. In this article,
discretion as an ingredient essential to satisfactory implementation of
sunshine laws have also been offered.42
In the present and preceding legislative sessions no fewer than
eighteen bills have been introduced to amend the Pennsylvania Sunshine
Law.43 Two of these bills specifically broaden terms that the courts have
narrowly construed. 44 These amendments would not be necessary if the
judiciary uniformly heeded the following remarks by Chief Justice Eagen
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: "We recognize that merely to hold
automatically that the legislature's intent does not encompass something
not specifically included in a statute that contains specific provisions can
sometimes thwart that intent." 45 In observing the legislative intent, one
court has specifically refused to approve "deceitful [and] sly methods of
avoiding the Sunshine act .... ",
B. Circumvention of the Pennsylvania Sunshine Law
A number of so-called "deceitful [and] sly methods" of evading the
Law have already emerged. In one such maneuver an agency might
conduct its discussion, deliberation, and decision-making in executive
session and then emerge, take a quick formal vote on the matter, and
retire for the evening.4 7 This tactic has been condemned in many juris-
dictions.4" A second way for an agency to avoid the rigors of the Sunshine
Professor Laymon Allen notes, "For the purpose of writing laws clearly and accurately, the
English language-or any other existing 'natural' language, for that matter-has distinct
limitations .... "
42. Wickham, supra note 14, at 494-95.
43. Pa. S. 461 & 605, Session of 1975; Pa. S. 1548, Session of 1976; Pa. S. 44, 100, 409
& 970, Session of 1977; Pa. H. 25, 37, 124, 125, 253, 361, 409, 637, 1054, 1374, & 1509,
Session of 1977.
44. Pa. H. 361 & 1374, Session of 1977.
45. Consumers Educ. & Pro. Ass'n v. Nolan, 470 Pa. 372, 388-89, 368 A.2d 675, 684
(1977). See also In re Emmanuel Baptist Church, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 427, 364 A.2d 536
(1976); "'The judiciary should not encroach upon the Legislature's right to require that the
activities of the School Board be conducted in the "sunshine." ' " Id. at 434, 364 A.2d at
540, quoting Canney v. Board of Pub. Inst., 278 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1973) (emphasis in
commonwealth court opinion).
46. Paterra v. Charleroi Area School Dist., 55 Wash. 115, 120 (Pa. C.P. 1975).
47. PA. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. 46, 4 PA. B. 2054, 2055 (1974).
48. See, e.g., Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Sup., 263
Cal. App. 2d 41, 50, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480,487 (1968) (courts may push statute beyond debatable
limits to block evasive techniques); Bagby v. School Dist. No. 1, 186 Colo. 428, 434, 528
P.2d 1299, 1302 (1974) (court was concerned with the middle ground between clearly formal
votes and clearly informal discussions); Times Publ'g Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470, 473-
74 (Fla. 1969) (how and why officials decide to act interests the public); Reeves v. Orleans
Parish School Bd., 281 So. 2d 719, 720-22 (La. 1973) (court concerned with middle ground as
in Bagby); Kramer v. Board of Adj., 80 N.J. Super. 454, 463-64, 194 A.2d 26, 30-31 (1963)
(refused to allow formal vote in public of a matter fully discussed and decided in private);
Peters v. Bowman Pub. School Dist. No. 1, 231 N.W.2d 817, 820 (N.D. 1975) (refused to
allow "re-run" formal votes of matter discussed fully in closed session).
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court had previously disallowed ratification of viola-
tions involving the Open Meetings Law of 1957. The court declared that permitting such
ratification "would emasculate the intent of the Act of providing for public disclosure and
discourse by permitting a public body to consider and approve controversial and unpopular
resolutions at secret meetings and then subsequently ratify these actions in a hastily called
meeting when its conduct is quest:ioned." Erie Munic. Airport Auth. v. Automation
Devices, Inc., 15 Pa. Commw. Ct. 273, 278, 325 A.2d 501, 504 (1974).
Law is to hold a series of round-robin telephone calls49 or short, "infor-
mal" meetings with only two or three agency members present.5 0 School
boards could employ a third tactic when the passage of business such as
certain contracts and teacher evaluations requires no formal votes by the
members. 5 ' Under these circumstances there is no need for a public
discussion because the Sunshine Law requires no formal action when
none was previously required.52 Much of the wariness and dissatisfaction
with the courts' implementation and the agencies' circumvention of the
Law grows out of the requirements enumerated in the Law. Both the
legislature's language and the judiciary's interpretations are important.
53
III. Requirements of the Pennsylvania Sunshine Law
A. Coverage-The Sunshine Law Covers All Governmental Agencies
Except the Judicial Branch
Much of the legislative debate about the Sunshine Law focused on
which agencies should or should not fall within the Law's coverage.
54
Pennsylvania courts, however, have had little difficulty interpreting the
legislature's definition of "agency. ' 5" The commonwealth court
concluded, "The statute would appear to have an all-encompassing
effect, excepting only actions by 'the judiciary or judicial branch.' -56
The attorney general elaborated, "Not specifically named but included
within the scope of the Act are councils, committees, sub-committees,
task forces or other groups of persons to which have been delegated
49. Allwein v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 15 Leb. 179, 181, 68 Pa. D. & C.2d 787,790 (C.P.
1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nora. In re Emmanuel Baptist Church, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct.
427, 364 A.2d 536 (1976); 1974 PA. SEN. J. 2099 (1974) (remarks of Senator Coppersmith).
50. PA. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. 46, 4 PA. B. 2054, 2055 (1974).
51. Mullen v. DuBois Area School Dist., 436 Pa. 211, 214-15, 259 A.2d 877, 879-80
(1969) (teacher evaluation); Kennedy v. Ringgold School Dist., 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 191, 196-
97, 309 A.2d 269, 272 (1973) (contract),
52. PA. ATr'Y GEN. OP. No. 46, 4 PA. B. 2054, 2057 (1974).
53. Strict, overly rigid demands of exactness from a word will frustrate the legislative
intent in enacting a statute. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
54. See notes 106-39 and accompanying text infra. See generally Shurtz, The Univer-
sity in the Sunshine: Application of the Open Meeting Laws to the University Setting, 5 J.L.
& EDUC. 453 (1976).
55. Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 261 (Purdon Supp. 1977):
"Agency" means any branch, department, board, authority or commission of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, any political subdivision of the Commonwealth,
or any State, municipal, township or school authority, school board, school gov-
erning body, commission, the board of trustees of all State-aided colleges and
universities, the board of trustees of all State-owned and State-related colleges and
universities and all community colleges, or similar organization created by or
pursuant to a statute which declares in substance that the organization performs or
has for its purpose the performance of an essential governmental function: Pro-
vided, That the term "agency" shall include the General Assembly, or any State
department, board, authority or commission to include the governor's cabinet
when meeting on official policy making business.
But see notes 123-28 and accompanying text infra (quasi-judicial agencies) and notes 129-39
and accompanying text infra (the legislature and its committees).
56. In re Emmanuel Baptist Church, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 427, 432, 364 A.2d 536, 539
(1976). See also PA. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. 46, 4 PA. B. 2054 (1974): "The Act applies to any
state or local public body performing governmental functions, the sole exception being the
judicial branch of government."
administrative or executive functions. '"" The Law does not cover
budgetary preparation meetings between the Governor, Auditor General,
and State Treasurer, 58 strictly administrative decisions by a department
head based on staff advice, 59 or staff conferences.
60
In interpreting which agencies are within the purview of the Sun-
shine Law, the courts have followed a policy initiated by their interpreta-
tions of the Right to Know Law definition of "agency' '6 1-- the Law must
be applied to as broad a group as possible. 62 Furthermore, the definition
of "agency" in the Sunshine Law63 is clearly much more expansive than
the definitions of "board" in the Open Meeting Law64 or of "agency" in
the Right to Know Law.
65
B. Open Meetings
The 1957 Open Meeting Law provides, "Every public meeting of a
board shall be open to the public."' The definition of "public meeting,"
however, precludes a broad application of this law. The definition's
language, which allows closed meetings for everything but the final
votes,67 invited the very circumvention the legislature sought to eliminate
in the Sunshine Law. 68 In recent sunshine laws, two approaches have
57. PA. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. 46, 4 PA.B. 2054 (1974).
58. PA. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. 58, 5 PA. B. 47, 48 (1975). For an analogous judicial
decision supporting the attorney general's opinion in this respect, see Butera v. Common-
wealth, Office of the Budget, 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 343, 347, 370 A.2d 1248, 1250 (1977)
(departmental budget reports are not included within the definition of "public records" in
the Right to Know Law).
59. Weder v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Educ., 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 328,334-35,365 A.2d
438, 441 (1976); Commonwealth, Dept. of Env. Res. v. Steward, 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 493,
497-98, 357 A.2d 255, 257 (1976).
60. PA. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. 46, 4 PA. B. 2054, 2055 (1974).
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(1) (Purdon 1959).
62. See Bogert v. Allentown Housing Auth., 426 Pa. 151, 155, 231 A.2d 147, 149(1967)
(the Right to Know Law coverage extends to housing authorities); In re Emmanuel Baptist
Church, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 427, 432, 364 A.2d 536, 539 (1976) (Sunshine Law coverage is
all-encompassing, with the exception of the judicial branch).
63. See note 55 supra.
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 251(A) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
65. See note 61 supra. The importance of this extension of the Sunshine Law's
coverage is discussed in notes 207-20 and accompanying text infra.
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 252 (Purdon 1959).
67. Id. § 251(B): "'Public Meeting.' That part of any meeting of a board during which
it votes upon any ordinance, resolution, motion or other official action .... "
68. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra; 1973 PA. H.R.J. 1840 (remark of
Representative Wise) ("[W]e are trying to prohibit that all-too-common practice of a local
school board, for example, going into five hours of executive session, thoroughly discussing
all the action they expect to take, and then coming in in a half hour meeting and adopting, by
motion seconded and carried, item I, a, b, c, d, e, f, g; item 2, 1,2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7-this sort of
thing-with no discussion, no opportunity for the public to really understand what it is all
about"); 1974 PA. SEN. J. 2097 (remark of Senator Duffield) ("I have found this: A meeting
was supposed to start at 7:30 p.m. We sat there for a half hour, they read the minutes, they
received the treasurer's report, et cetera. About 8:00 or 8:30 o'clock they decided to go into
executive session, where they went and stayed until midnight, and by that time most of the
weak hearted had left. I think that has been a very sore spot on the part of our legislative
process, both on the local level, the State level and, possibly, the judicial level").
been used to establish which meetings should be open-the subject matter
approach and the formal action approach.
1. Subject Matter or Formal Action Approach to Open Meet-
ings.-The differences between the two approaches and the relative
merits of each have been well discussed in the literature. 69 Statutes using
the subject matter approach open all meetings of agencies covered by the
statute unless those meetings fall within certain subject matter exceptions
specifically set forth in the statute.70 Statutes using the formal action
approach, however, open all meetings in which there is formal action
(however it is defined) regardless of the subject matter of the meeting. 7'
Some statutes using the formal action approach, such as the Pennsylvania
Law, also provide for some subject matter exceptions.72 The defect in
both the formal action and the hybrid statutes is that they do not signifi-
cantly alter the prestatutory situation. 73 Because it is "much too easy to
conduct mere 're-run' votes after all the vital issues have been resolved in
private sessions," 74 the courts should not use the formal approach unless
it is specifically articulated in the statute.
75
The Pennsylvania Sunshine Law emerged from the General Assem-
bly as one of the mixed formal action/subject matter combinations about
which commentators have warned. 76 Despite this improvident drafting,
the intent of the prime sponsor, Representative Knepper, remained orient-
ed toward the subject matter approach. "I consider an executive session
to be a meeting in which there is unofficial discussion concerning whatev-
er the subject matter is, that Iam not allowed to talk about."7 7 The Law,
nevertheless, contains the formal action provision and the courts must
deal with it as it was enacted.
2. Decision-Making Process or Formal Actions-Which Requires
Openness?-On January 10, 1977, Judge Blatt spoke for a unanimous
69. Note, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199, supra note 2, at 1208-10; Comment, 45 Miss. L.J.
1151 (1974), supra note 18, at 1172-76.
70. Note, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199, supra note 2, at 1210; Comment, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151
(1974), supra note 18, at 1173-76.
71. Comment, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151 (1974), supra note 18, at 1172-73.
72. Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 263 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
The subject matter exceptions concern personnel and labor disputes. See notes 107-14 and
accompanying text infra.
73. These statutes may open no more of the substantive debate and discussion to
public scrutiny than was required at common law or under existing legislation. Note, 75
HARv. L. REV. 1199, supra note 2, at 1210.
74. Wickham, supra note 14, at 492.
75. Shurtz, supra note 54, at 456.
76. See notes 73-75 and accompanying text supra. Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 261 (Purdon Supp. 1977) (" 'Formal action' means the taking of any
vote on any resolution, rule, order, motion, regulation or ordinance or the setting of any
official policy").
77. 1973 PA. H.R.J. 1841 (emphasis added). In transcribing Representative Knepper's
remarks, the printer inserted the comma between "is- and "that." For consistency with
Representative Knepper's other remarks, the phrase, "that I am not allowed to talk about"
modifies "subject matter" and the comma should, therefore, be omitted.
commonwealth court in Judge v. Pocius 78 in an opinion that set Pennsyl-
vania citizens' rights to open meetings back to 1957. The holding of the
case, and the crux of the current difficulties with the Pennsylvania
Sunshine Law, is that "formal action" does not encompass the acts of
deliberation, discussion, and decision prior to and culminating in the
affirmative formal action that renders official the final decision of public
agencies. 7 9 Judge Blatt explained, "We believe that if the legislature had
intended that the preliminary activities of deliberation, discussion, and
decision which lead up to affirmative formal action be public, those acts
would have been specifically included within the statutory definition of
formal action .... ''80
The issue can be neither the importance of nor the policy underlying
the requirement that the decision-making process be open. The weight of
authority, both judicial and academic, leans heavily toward more open-
ness.8 1 Moreover, the legislators themselves recognized the vital need for
an open decision-making process:
Sure the present law makes it illegal to vote on this public
business in so-called executive session. But-and this is a key
point-in some instances . . . everything but the final vote is
being handled in a 'public not admitted' closed meeting ....
[I]t's our job to. . . right the wrong, to open the closed door, to
eliminate the secretness-that freedom and understanding
might flourish. 2
The court in Judge insisted on applying a strict interpretation of the
statute's provisions.8 3 It attempted to follow the legislative intent, as
expressed by the language of the Law, but looked neither to the actual
remarks of the legislators nor to the intent implied in those remarks. It
implicitly and incorrectly applied the rule of construction that when a
statute has explicit language expressing its purpose, a court may not
engage in a further search for the legislative intent.8 4
The best interpretation of which meetings and hearings must be open
is provided by the attorney general in an advisory opinion"5 in which he
78. 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 139, 367 A.2d 788 (1977).
79. Id. at 144-45, 367 A.2d at 791. The complaint was made about a school board
"work session" in which a number of subjects were discussed and later voted on in a regular
meeting. Id. at 143, 367 A.2d at 790.
80. Id. at 145, 367 A.2d at 791. But see note 45 and accompanying text supra.
81. See, e.g., Board of Public Inst. v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693,699 (Fla. 1969) (rights of
the public to have government affairs opened regardless of the good intentions of the
officials); Note, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199, supra note 2, at 1210. See also notes 8-18 and
accompanying text supra.
82. 1973 PA. H.R.J. 2151 (remarks of Representative Knepper). Representative Knep-
per further noted, "We have drafted this bill to eliminate as many abuses as possible of the
public's right to know and understand what its elected government agencies think, say, and,
do. " Id. (emphasis added); 1974 PA. SEN. J. 2098 (remark of Senator Duffield emphasizing
that the public wants to know how decisions are made, and not only that they are made).
83. 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 144-45, 367 A.2d at 791.
84. See notes 227-29 and accompanying text infra. Other rules of construction subor-
dinated by the Judge decision are discussed at notes 189-235 and accompanying text infra.
85. PA. Arr'v GEN. Op. No. 46, 4 PA. B. 2054 (1974). Pennsylvania Attorney Gener-
al's Opinions are binding on all department heads, boards, commissions, and officers of the
considered the statute and its history, and concluded, "The Legislature
intended the full decision-making process of an agency to be revealed to
public scrutiny." 86 After ascertaining the legislative intent, 87 the attorney
general declared, "[T]he hearing and all deliberations leading up to a
vote by the agency members are to take place in full public view
... ,,"88 The attorney general set forth his interpretation of section two
of the Law as a whole: "[A]ny gathering of those members of an agency
with sufficient voting power to make a determination on behalf of the
entire agency-i.e., a majority or quorum of the agency-constitutes a
meeting or hearing."
89
In a recent opinion that analyzes the effect of Judge on the applica-
tion of the Sunshine Law, the attorney general has modified the previous
opinion by removing the "activities of deliberation, discussion, and
preliminary decision which lead up to affirmative formal actions" from
the coverage of the Law.
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3. Executive Sessions"' in the Pennsylvania Sunshine Law.-
"There are times . . . when I think there needs to be confidentiality, and
it is the intent of [the bill] . . . to permit the confidentiality of an
executive session that is necessary, but not to use an executive session to
abuse the public or to run and to hide." 92 With these words Representa-
tive Knepper outlined the reasons for an executive session.93 The legisla-
ture was concerned that allowing free use of closed or executive sessions
"leaves a bad taste in the public's mouth;" '  but the lawmakers had
difficulty striking a balance between permitting closed sessions and
providing maximum openness. 95 The legislators' failure to draft the most
Commonwealth until another opinion is rendered. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 192 (Purdon
Supp. 1977).
86. PA. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. 46, 4 PA. B. 2054, 2054 (1974).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. Another good definition (that corresponds with the legislative intent) of what
meetings must be open may 8e found in Paterra v. Charleroi Area School Dist., 55 Wash.
115 (Pa. C.P. 1975):
'Formal action is scheduled' means that if a decision is made, a policy formulated,
or an expense or appointment decided upon, subject to taking effect later upon
formal action, such a thing has been 'scheduled.' On the other hand, a mere listing
of an item for decision or determination at a stated later date is not the 'scheduling'
of formal action.
Id. at 121.
90. PA. ATrr'Y GEN. Op. No. 13, 7 PA. B. 2041, 2043 (1977).
91. Executive sessions are provided in the Law to allow interruption of an open
meeting for discussion of certain subject matter. As used in the text, however, executive
session also refers to any regularly scheduled closed meetings.
92. 1973 PA. H.R.J. 1841 (remark of Representative Knepper). See also id. at 1840
(remarks of Representative Wise claiming that the proposed bill would prohibit "re-run"
formal vote meetings).
93. Id. at 1839 ("Particularly, I would suggest that employee negotiations, real estate
propositions, and so forth, certainly are items of confidentiality which should be protect-
ed"). It was only for those "rather delicate matters," id., that Representative Knepper
wanted the protection of executive sessions.
94. Id. at 1923 (remark by Representative Wise).
95. See, e.g., the floor debate in the senate, 1974 PA. SEN. J. 2096-99.
effective language to achieve their goals is obvious, but their intent
should not be disregarded.
The courts should hold that the use of executive sessions is only
permissible under narrowly limited circumstances, because they derogate
the general policy of open meetings. 96 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has found (albeit after the Judge v. Pocius decision) that the Sunshine
Law requires openness for the policy-making decisions of agencies in
"clear distinction" to the confidentiality that is permitted for "decisions
about the character and competence of individuals."- 97 In a decision
allowing an agency to engage in informal information-seeking, one Penn-
sylvania Common Pleas Court warned public bodies to "avoid not only
evil but the seeming of evil. It is a bit much for the whole board to meet
for an evening and do nothing. 98
Rather than looking solely to rules of statutory construction, the
courts should more closely scrutinize the legislative history of the Law.
The true nature of the legislative intent emerges from the senate floor
debates between Senators Coppersmith and Hill, who wished to change
the bill to allow unrestricted use of executive sessions, and Senators
Nolan and Duffield, who wanted to restrict the use of closed sessions as
much as possible. 9 The evolution of the successive executive session
provisions of the bill provides the best example of intent. The original
version of the bill prohibited all executive sessions in violation of the rest
of the bill. 100 When the bill was reported out of committee, it was
amended to allow executive sessions generally, but none were permitted
in which official votes would be tallied."'0 The next bill allowed execu-
tive sessions only if no formal action would be taken. 0 2 The fourth
version provided for recess to executive session during an otherwise open
meeting for the dismissal or discipline of a public, elected officer or for
labor negotiations. It also provided that executive sessions were not
prohibited if no formal action would be taken. 103 The final version of the
Law, passed by both houses and signed by Governor Shapp, 1°4 removed
the provision allowing executive sessions without formal action. 105 Clear-
ly, the Pennsylvania General Assembly considered allowing executive
sessions for all but formal actions, and proponents of such a provision
devoted their best efforts to implementing it, but any such authorization
96. See News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Interim Bd. of Educ., 29 N.C. App. 37, 47,
223 S.E.2d 580, 586-87 (1976).
97. Consumers Educ. & Pro. Ass'n v. Nolan, 470 Pa. 372, 389, 368 A.2d 675, 684
(1977).
98. Paterra v. Charleroi Area School Dist., 55 Wash. 115, 124 (Pa. C.P. 1975).
99. See note 95 supra.
100. Pa. H. 124, Printer's No. 144, Session of 1973.
101. Pa. H. 124, Printer's No. 951, Session of 1973.
102. Pa. H. 124, Printer's No. 1638, Session of 1973.
103. Pa. H. 124, Printer's No. 2428, Session of 1973.
104. Act of July 19, 1974, P.L, 486, No. 175.
105. Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 263 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
was removed before final enactment. Consequently, the Pennsylvania
legislature must have intended to permit executive sessions for only
particular subject matter.
C. Subject Matter Exceptions to Sunshine Laws
There are seven general categories of subject matter exceptions to
open meeting legislation. The first two, personal reputation and labor
negotiations, are included in the Pennsylvania Sunshine Law. t06 The next
two, economic considerations and security and defense matters, have not
yet been addressed by the Pennsylvania legislature. The fifth exception
for supervening state or federal laws applies to all sunshine laws. The last
two subjects of exception, quasi-judicial agencies and the legislature,
have been specifically included in the Pennsylvania Law.
1. Personal Reputations.-Section three of the Pennsylvania Sun-
shine Law establishes two situations in which an agency may interrupt its
public meeting and enter into executive session.1"7 In the first of these
special sessions an agency can handle in confidence any complaints or
actions against a public employee, elected officer, or other agent, unless
such person requests a public hearing. 108 This exception was enacted to
protect the reputation of government employees until the charges are
substantiated. 109 The legislature has not decided what degree of substanti-
ation is necessary, and no cases have decided thequestion, although an
analogous situation in strictly investigatory proceedings provides the
necessary guidance:
After discussion of such investigatory material has been
concluded and once an investigation results in formal charges
being filed or a decision made not to recommend or impose
sanctions against the individual who is the subject of the inves-
tigation, any subsequent meetings or hearings must be conduct-
ed publicly and may be done so without compromising the
continuing confidentiality of the actual investigatory
documents. " 0
Once the board or agency decides to take formal action against the
employee, or decides to take no action, further discussion about the
matter shall be open. 11i
106. Id. These exceptions are in the Law only to allow executive sessions that interrupt
an ongoing open meeting. It is clear, however, from the legislative history that such
meetings may be independently called in executive sessions. 1973 PA. H.R.J. 1842 (remark
of Representative Knepper that agencies will be able to schedule executive sessions for
personnel matters and labor negotiations before a meeting).
107. Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 263 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
108. Id.
109. 1974 PA. H.R.J. 3094 (remarks of Representative Knepper).
110. PA. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. 46, 4 PA. B. 2054, 2056 (1974).
111, Other personal reputation exemptions from open meeting laws are as follows:
student records and college admission information, Shurtz, supra note 54, at 461-62,
medical histories, Lawrence, supra note 41, at 791-92; PA. ArT'Y GEN. Op. No. 46,4 PA. B.
2054, 2056 (1974), licensing of professionals, id., criminal accusations, Comment, Govern-
ment in the Sunshine Act: Opening Federal Agency Meetings, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 154, 186-88
2. Labor Negotiations.-A special executive session is also al-
lowed for the purpose of considering what action an agency might take in
labor negotiations."t 2 Many sources have spoken of the need for such an
exception to open meetings. "3 Representative Maloney noted that open-
ing labor negotiations to the public may be an unfair labor practice:
ITihe Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board has ruled . . .that
labor negotiations may be conducted in private and that a
school board, which insisted that the negotiation meetings be
open to the public and the press, had committed an unfair labor
practice ....
I think anyone who is familiar with labor law and familiar
with labor negotiations is going to find that this is going to
present a serious problem to those agencies and boards." 4
3. Economic Considerations.-Exceptions to openness for con-
siderations of budgetary matters have not yet been included in the Penn-
sylvania Sunshine Law." 5 These exceptions are intended to prevent
premature disclosure of prospective business or land transactions of the
agencies. Legislatures fear that resulting speculation and higher prices
will cost the public unnecessary money. 1
16
4. Security and Defense Matters .- Security and defense are not
major areas of concern for states. Some aspects of states' operations,
however, require public security and should, therefore, be excepted from
open meeting requirements. I7 National defense and security are legiti-
mate concerns of the federal government and must be considered in all
cases. 118
5. Supervening Laws .- Supervening laws provide two exceptions
to the Pennsylvania Sunshine Law. The first specific exclusion arises
from the provision in Act 175 that any laws "which specifically provide
(1976) (but see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (Purdon Supp. 1977), providing that criminal
records can be considered public records), and certain areas of statutorily confidential
information, see notes 119-22 and accompanying text infra.
112. Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 263 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
113. See, e.g., In re Emmanuel Baptist Church, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 427,433,364 A.2d
536, 539 (1976); Note, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199, supra note 2, at 1208; Comment, l8 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 159 (1976), supra note 28. See also 1973 PA. H.R.J. 2150 (1973) (remarks of
Representative Rappaport that there must be a way to free the agency from public posturing
in labor negotiations).
114. 1973 PA. H.R.J. 1840.
The need for an exemption for labor negotiations has even been established in the
Florida courts, despite their extremely broad, diligent application of the Florida sunshine
law. See Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972), noted in 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 603
(1973).
115. But see Pa. S. 970, Session of 1977 (the bill excludes from the Sunshine Law
industrial development authorities' consideration of loan applications).
116. Note, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199, supra note 2, at 1209.
117. Id.; Recchie & Chernoski, supra note 2, at 511. A typical example of a state
concern for security is the activity of its law enforcement agencies.
118. 5 U.S.C.A. 552b(i) (West 1977). For further discussion of the issue of security, see
Markham, supra note 17, at 481.
for the confidentiality of information" are excluded from repeal. 19 This
exclusion excepts from the Law's coverage both attorney-client relation-
ships-decisions concerning pending litigation or other legal matters
affecting the agencyl2 0 -and investigations by established, authorized
agencies. 121 The second exception concerns voluntary compliance with
federal mandates of confidentiality in matters usually tied to federal
funding. 12" Both of the exceptions, whether by choice of the state or by
federal mandate, are based on overriding policy considerations of the
need for confidentiality.
6. Quasi-Judicial Agencies .- Although most commentary has as-
sumed a need for closed meetings in the quasi-judicial affairs of agen-
cies,' 23 Pennsylvania has not excepted such agencies from the require-
ments of open meetings. Despite battles in both houses of the General
Assembly, 124 all amendments excepting quasi-judicial bodies and their
119. Open Meeting Law, Act of July 19, 1974, P.L. 486, No. 175, § 10.
120. PA. Arr'v GEN. Op. No. 46, PA. B. 2054, 2056-57 (1974); PA. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No.
13, 7 PA.B. 2041, 2042 (1977).
The rules for attorneys' behavior and conduct are promulgated by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and therefore have the effect of law. See In re Morrissey Estate, 440 Pa. 439,
443, 269 A.2d 662, 665 (1970); Dombrowski v. Philadelphia, 431 Pa. 199, 203, 245 A.2d 238,
241 (1968). Because those rules governing attorneys deal with confidentiality and § 10 of Act
of July 19, 1974, P.L. 486, No. 175 repeals all laws conflicting with the Law except those
specifically providing for confidentiality, the two cover the same subject matter and must be
dealt with in pari materia. When there are special and general provisions in the same act,
either meaning is given to both or the special provision shall prevail. I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1933 (Purdon Supp. 1977). Because the rules of attorneys' conduct are specific and the
repealer exception is general, the rules of confidentiality governing an attorney and his
client must prevail. See PA. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. 13, 7 PA.B. 2041, 2042 (1977). See also note
133 infra, in which this rule is applied in the construction of the provisions dealing with the
Law's coverage of the General Assembly.
Cases from other jurisdictions supporting this interpretation are in the majority. See,
e.g., People ex rel. Hopf v. Barger, 30 III. App. 3d 525, 535-36, 332 N.E.2d 649, 659-60
(1975); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Housing & Redev. Auth. of Minneapolis, 246
N.W.2d 448, 450-54, 251 N.W.2d 620, 622-26 (Minn. 1976) (the Minnesota court provides an
excellent discussion of the effect of open meeting legislation on attorney-client relationships
affecting agencies); Port of Seattle v. Rio, 16 Wash. App. 718, -, 559 P.2d 18, 23 (1977),
121. PA. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. 46, 4 PA. B. 2054, 2056(1974). Because the Pennsylvania
Sunshine Law does not repeal other laws specifically providing for confidentiality, the
provision of the Right to Know Law of 1957 exempting reports of investigations from the
definition of records, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (Purdon Supp. 1977), therefore,
places such investigations in the confidential list and exempts them from the coverage of the
Sunshine Law. See also In re Emmanuel Baptist Church, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 427, 433, 364
A.2d 536, 539 (1976); Lawrence, supra note 41, at 805-06.
122. Note, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199, supra note 2, at 1201. See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
65, § 66.1(2) (Purdon Supp. 1977):
[T]he term 'public records' . shall not include any record, document, material,
exhibit, pleading, report, memorandum or other paper. . . which would result in
the loss by the Commonwealth or any of its political subdivisions or commissions
or State or municipal authorities of Federal funds.
123. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 41, at 808-10; Mathew, supra note 40, at 552-54;
Shurtz, supra note 54, at 459-60.
124. 1973 PA. H.R.J. 2070-72 (remarks of Representative Englehart about his amend-
ments exempting from the Law any agency, except the Pennsylvania Utility Commission,
that is involved in a decision-making process of a judicial nature); 1974 PA. H.R.J. 3092
(Representative Knepper placed on the floor of the House an amendment removing the
exemptions of Representative Englehart's previous amendment); id. at 3181 (Representa-
tive Englehart sought to reintroduce the exemptions).
decisions from the Sunshine Law were defeated. 125 The common pleas
courts of Pennsylvania initially differed about whether the quasi-judicial
nature of zoning board hearings excepted them from the Law's definition
of "agency."1 26 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed one
decision and in dictum expressed support for a holding that quasi-judicial
functions of agencies were not within the purview of the Law. 127 But
when it directly confronted the issue, the court held that quasi-judicial
tribunals are included in the Law's definition of agency. 128
7. The State Legislature.-Generally, a legislator is immune from
civil or criminal prosecution only if his activity falls "within the 'legiti-
mate legislative sphere'; [and] if it does, the action against the legislator
calling [the activity] into question . . . must be dismissed."' 29 The
Pennsylvania courts have allowed the legislature a large measure of
responsibility for declaring what is precisely within that umbrella of
immunity, especially in the cases concerning the Sunshine Law. 130 Be-
cause the General Assembly has included its own affairs-and those of its
committees-within the coverage of the open meeting legislation, 131 it
has been necessary for the courts to redefine "legitimate legislative
action." The courts have declared that "legitimate legislative action"
occurs in two ways. First, if the activity is expressly covered and the
1974 PA. SEN. J. 2096 (remarks of Senator Coppersmith that the decision-making
meetings of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies should not be made public); id. at 2098-99
(Senator Coppersmith again warned that such meetings must be allowed to remain private).
125. In fact, the Pennsylvania General Assembly has recently enacted legislation that
specifically places the Public Utility Commission under the coverage of the Sunshine Law.
Act of October 7, 1976, P.L. 1075, No. 216, § 7 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 457. l(b)
(Purdon Supp. 1977)).
126. Compare Ailwein v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 15 Leb. 179, 181,68 Pa. D. & C.2d 787,
789 (C.P. 1975) and Patwardham v. Bedminster Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 29 Bucks 36, 37
(Pa. C.P. 1976) (quasi-judicial agencies are covered by the Sunshine Law) with Enck v.
Lititz Borough, 64 Lanc. 465 (Pa. C.P. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Enck v.
Anderson, 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 318, 360 A.2d 801 (1976) (quasi-judicial agencies are not
covered by the Law).
127. Enck v. Anderson, 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 318, 322, 360 A.2d 802, 804 (1976) (the
commonwealth court decided that the lower court in Enck v. Lititz Borough "ably analy-
zed" the case in its holding that the Zoning Hearing Board is excluded from the Sunshine
Law because of the exclusion of meetings of the judicial branch).
128. In re Emmanuel Baptist Church, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 427, 436, 364 A.2d 536, 541
(1976).
129. Consumers Educ. & Pro. Ass'n v. Nolan, 470 Pa. 372, 382, 368 A.2d 675, 681
(1977). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in arriving at its conclusion, held that the Speech
and Debate Clause of art. 1, § 6 of the United States Constitution was the model for art. 1, §
15 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
130. See, e.g., Brutto v. Cianfrani, No. 1385 C.D. 1977 (Pa. Commw. Ct., filed July 15,
1977).
131. Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 267 (Purdon Supp. 1977):
"For the purposes of this act, meetings of the Legislature which are covered are as follows:
all meetings of committees where bills are considered, all hearings where testimony is taken,
all sessions of the House of Representatives and the Senate."
For further discussion of the General Assembly's authority to waive its constitutional
immunity and protection, see Brief for Petitioner at 7-9, Brutto v. Cianfrani, No. 1385 C.D.
1977 (Pa. Commw. Ct., filed July 15, 1977).
legislator complies with the Law, the courts will not interfere. 32 Second,
if the activity is not expressly covered by the Law, the courts will not
interfere regardless how it is conducted.1
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Another very important aspect of opening the legislative process to
the provisions of the Sunshine Law is the effect public exposure may have
on party political caucuses. Pennsylvania specifically excludes its legisla-
tive party caucuses from coverage. 134 One commentator has remarked,
however, that in local government in which there may be a tribunal of
supervisors, the majority party could insist on a party caucus to discuss
pending business and relevant party policy and effectively circumvent the
Law. 35 He therefore suggests that the General Assembly amend the Law
to explicitly cover local party caucuses. 136 Because membership and
activity in a political party have been associated with and protected by the
constitutional right of freedom of association,137 however, there must be
a showing of compelling state interest to open the proceedings of political
groups by statute. 138 The hesitation of the Pennsylvania courts to apply or
extend the Sunshine Law indicates that they are unlikely to find a
compelling state interest. 1
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The only meetings, therefore, that Pennsylvania citizens are prevent-
ed from witnessing are those that deal with personal reputations, labor
negotiations, investigations, specifically confidential material, and cer-
tain legislative matters. The question whether the citizens may actually
participate in the remaining meetings is a subject requiring further exami-
nation.
132. If the General Assembly does not comply with the provisions the legislators set up
for themselves, the courts may intervene. Brutto v. Cianfrani, No. 1385 C.D. 1977, at 2-4
(Pa. Commw. Ct., filed July 15, 1977) (the legislators attempted to hold a meeting to
consider a bill behind closed doors, and the court enjoined them from barring public access).
133. See Consumers Educ. & Pro. Ass'n v. Nolan, 470 Pa. 372, 382, 368 A.2d 675, 680-
81 (1977). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also decided that the general provision placing
the General Assembly within the purview of the Pennsylvania Sunshine Law (§ 261) and the
specific provision naming portions of the General Assembly that are covered by the Law
and portions that are not (§ 267) are not contradictory. The latter section serves to clarify the
former and is, therefore, controlling. Id. at 384-88, 368 A.2d at 681-84.
See also id. at n,25, indicating that even if courts decide they have the authority to rule
on the matter, if the bill that was the subject of the meeting claimed to have violated the Law
is introduced on the floor of the General Assembly, there might be nothing the courts can
do. See Mikell v. School Dist. of Phila., 359 Pa. 113, 123, 58 A.2d 339, 344 (1948) (failure of
the legislature to follow a constitutional directory provision is not a justiciable question, and
the act, once duly certified, cannot thereafter be attacked); Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401,
412 (1877) (once a law is enacted, it is official and the courts cannot look behind it to see if it
was passed improperly).
134. Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 267 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
135. Comment, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 536, supra note 34, at 545-46.
136. Id. Ohio's open meeting law covers all meetings of the majority of agency
members and, therefore, includes caucuses by the majority party. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
121.22(B)(2) (Baldwin 1977).
137. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
138. For a discussion of the steps necessary to determine a compelling state interest
and a discussion of party caucuses and open meeting legislation generally, see Recchie &
Chernoski, supra note 2, at 506-07.
139. But see id. The authors express their belief that the necessary compelling state
interest exists and that Ohio courts will accept it and open the majority party caucuses to the
public.
D. Public Participation in Open Meetings
Despite Aristotle's warning that utmost participation in government
by all persons is essential to liberty and equality in democracy, 140 the
Sunshine Law does not provide for direct participation in our representa-
tive form of government, 141 nor was it intended to. 142 Much uneasiness
had been expressed in the General Assembly about balancing the right of
the public to speak out at an open meeting 43 and the need to maintain
order for effective governmental action. 1' The agencies whose meetings
are open under the Sunshine Law were specifically created to be able to
act quickly, and constant interruptions to allow public participation would
negate that purpose. The result of the legislative balancing was section
six, 145 which provides that the public may speak but also that the board
may establish rules to suspend public discussion when the need arises (as
long as the Law itself is not otherwise violated). 146 Participation in
government under the existing laws means only attendance at meet-
ings. 147 To further secure this right to attend meetings, the Pennsylvania
Sunshine Law provides detailed notice requirements with which agencies
and the General Assembly must comply.
148
E. Presenting a Cause of Action under the Sunshine Law
1. Original Jurisdiction Over Sunshine Law Cases.--"The
140. 10 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1291 (Politica) (B. Jowett, trans., 1921): "For if
liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will
be best attained when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost."
141. See PA. ArT'v GEN. Op. No. 46, 4 PA. B. 2054, 2057 (1974).
142. 1974 PA. H.R.J. 3282 (remark of Representative Knepper that it was never his
intention that the bill require any public agency to hold a town meeting); id. at 3305 (remark
of Representative W.D. Hutchinson that the bill is not meant to guarantee the right of the
public to debate the issues with the agency member).
143. Id. at 3098 (remark of Representative Shane); id. at 3282-83 (remarks of Repre-
sentative Doyle demanding that an amendment be defeated that would have seriously
curtailed public involvement in the meetings).
144. Id. (remarks of Representative Zearfoss that the amendments to further limit the
public's participation are necessary to ensure proper functioning of the agency); 1973 PA.
H.R.J. 1923 & 2152 (remarks of Representatives Kistler, Caputo, and Vann who expressed
concern about overly enthusiastic public participation). See notes 24-26 and accompanying
text supra.
145. Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 266 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
146. 1973 PA. H.R.J. 1923 (remark of Representative Knepper explaining that the bill
allowed a board or agency to make rules to prevent or control disruptive public behavior at
public meetings).
147. Wickham, supra note 14, at 489. See also Paterra v. Charleroi Area School Dist.,
55 Wash. 115, 122 (Pa. C.P. 1975) ("there is no requirement of law that all the information
the board and members get must be divulged to [citizens attending a meeting] publicly").
148. Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 265 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has made the point that "a meeting cannot be deemed to
be public merely because its doors are open to the public if the public is not properly
informed of its time and place." Consumers Educ. & Pro. Ass'n v. Nolan, 470 Pa. 372, 384
n.4, 368 A.2d 675, 681 n.4 (1977).
In the event of an actual emergency presenting a clear and present danger to life or
property, the rules requiring notice may be suspended. The agency shall not, however, bar
members of the public who are present and who seek access to the emergency meeting.
Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 265(e) (Purdon Supp. 1977). See
Comment, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 536, supra note 34, at 544-45.
Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of actions involving
State agencies and the courts of common pleas shall have original juris-
diction of actions involving other agencies .... .- 149 Pennsylvania
courts have maintained a properly strict adherence to this requirement and
have ruled that an agency is local and within the original jurisdiction of
the local court of common pleas even when it was specifically created by
state legislation' 50 and when it functions in a number of counties.'15
2. Standing to Bring an Action under the Sunshine Law .- Before
1957 the courts ruled that the only restriction on a person examining
records that have statutorily been made public 152 was that his request be
reasonable in respect to the time, place, and manner of inspection. 153 The
common-law rules allowed persons with a "personal or property inter-
est" to inspect records to which there was no statutory access. 154 The
Right to Know Law was enacted and the public's boldness in seeking
access to records increased.15 5 The courts became more stringent in their
decisions requiring reasonableness of access and began to require that
petitioners specify the records they wished to see.
156
The Pennsylvania Sunshine Law has no special requirement of
standing to bring suit. 1 57 Although the legislature provided that "action
149. Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 269 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
150. See, e.g., Scott v. Shapiro, 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 479, 483-84, 339 A.2d 597, 599
(1975) (SEPTA).
151. See, e.g., Southeastern Penn. Transit Auth. v. Kohn, 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 546,549,
336 A.2d 904, 906 (1975) (SEPTA).
152. Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 264 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
Minutes of all public meetings of an agency must be taken and recorded as public records
according to the provisions of the Right to Know Law.
There is some question about how these records must be made-i.e., may they be
taped, and if so, by whom? Two bills before the Pennsylvania House of Representatives
specifically permit tape recording an open meeting. One bill, Pa. H. 125, Session of 1977,
permits taping by the media and the other, Pa. H. 637, Session of 1977, permits taping by
anyone.
153. See, e.g., In re Simon, 353 Pa. 514,518, 46 A.2d 243,245 (1946); Commonwealth
ex rel. Eagen v. Dunmore Bor. School Dirs., 343 Pa. 440, 443, 23 A.2d 468,470 (1942) (right
to inspect records must be carried out so that the agency is not unduly interrupted or
interfered with); Butcher v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 163 Pa. Super. Ct. 343, 345, 61 A.2d 367,
368 (1948) (when, by statute, records are open for public inspection, there need not be any
particular reason to examine them, and it may be done out of idle curiosity).
154. Wiley v. Woods, 393 Pa. 341, 348, 141 A.2d 844, 848 (1958). The "personal or
property interest" mentioned is, in essence, a requirement that the complaining citizen have
standing.
155. After 1957, "[a]ny citizen of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [had] the right to
take extracts or make copies of public records .... ." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.3
(Purdon 1959). The right to examine extended only to "public records" as defined by the
act. Id. § 66.2(b) (Purdon Supp. 1977). Persons with the "personal or property interest,"
however, could continue to demand common-law access to documents not within the
definition. Wiley v. Woods, 393 Pa. 341, 348, 141 A.2d 844, 848 (1958).
156. Mooney v. Temple Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 448 Pa. 424, 428 n.8, 292 A.2d 395, 397
n.8 (1972). A year later the same court demanded that requests for examination of welfare
recipient lists be for specifically named recipients only. McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 453 Pa.
147, 156, 308 A.2d 888, 893 (1973), rev'g 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 574, 284 A.2d 334 (1971).
157. The person bringing the action is even granted a choice of three venues. See
Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 269 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
may be brought by any person," 5 8 the commonwealth court has refused
to consider one petitioner's claim of a violation of the Sunshine Law
because he "has not alleged nor shown any prejudice due to the [alleged
violation]." 159
This was wise use of judicial discretion. One of the principal fears
voiced by commentators was that actions might be brought claiming
violation of the Sunshine Law when no violation had occurred or when
damage was minor and inconsequential. 160 The claims would be brought
merely because the complainant had made an unsuccessful bid for an
agency contract and was seeking revenge. A requirement that the alleged
violation have some specific impact on the petitioner will alleviate this
fear. The danger that courts might strictly construe the Law to avoid an
unjust result would be eliminated because they can dispose of such
malicious actions.
161
3. What Cause of Action Must be Alleged?-Pennsylvania courts
have carefully examined the elements necessary to allege violations of the
Sunshine Law:
It is . . .the teaching of Bogert [v. Allentown Housing Auth.,
426 Pa. 151, 231 A.2d 147 (1967)] that a failure to furnish
information [or grant access to a meeting] is not itself a cause of
action; it is the taking of formal action at a closed meeting
which is invalid, and which gives a cause of action to one, who
. . .seeks to knock out decisions taken in an impermissible
mode. 
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Difficulty arises when a complaint alleges a closed meeting and an
unknown effect on later formal action because the petitioner does not
know what transpired. The commonwealth court held that the lack of
precise allegations concerning the closed meetings was fatal to the com-
plaint when extensive public hearings were held on the matter.163 One
court of common pleas reluctantly dismissed an action because there was
no proof of formal action taken at the allegedly unlawful meeting.' 64 The
158. Id.
159. Board of Comm'rs v. Hakim, 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 661, 664 n.1, 339 A.2d 905, 907
n.j (1975).
160. Comment, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 536, supra note 34, at 553-59.
161. The courts, however, maintain their strict interpretation. See notes 212-13 and
accompanying text infra. When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, nevertheless, made a
determined effort to ascertain the legislative intent from the Law and was certain the claim
was valid, it required no extra-statutory standing. Consumers Educ. & Pro. Ass'n v. Nolan,
470 Pa. 372, 381-82, 368 A.2d 675, 680 (1977).
162. Paterra v. Charleroi Area School Dist., 55 Wash. 115, 120 (Pa. C.P. 1975). The
same court declared, "[T]he Sunshine Law seeks openness as a means to an end and not as
an end in itself." Id. at 121.
163. Redmond v. Commonwealth, Milk Mkt'g Bd., 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 368, 371, 363
A.2d 840, 842 (1976). But see Kramer v. Board of Adj., 80 N.J. Super. 454,463-64, 194 A.2d
26, 31 (1963) (even though there had been no formal vote at the closed meeting and there was
some discussion during the public meeting, the earlier full discussion invalidated the later
formal vote).
164. Paterra v. Charleroi Area School Dist., 55 Wash. 115, 123-24 (Pa. C.P. 1975).
question remains, how can a person denied access to a meeting discover
what occurred at that meeting?
165
Once the courts examine the Law's requirements and their own
procedural rules and determine that a violation of the Law has occurred,
statutory remedies are available under the Law. The courts may invalidate
actions taken illegally, fine members who intentionally violated the Law,
or enjoin future violations. Each of these remedies has elicited critical
commentary.
H. Remedies to Enforce the Sunshine Law
1. Criminal Sanctions-Fines and Imprisonment.-Substantial
emphasis has been placed on the comparatively de minimus value of a
criminal sanction for Sunshine Law violations in view of the problems
created.166 Even the legislators, in successfully amending the bill, re-
marked, "[W]e do not really want to send public officials to jail for
violating the open-meeting [law]. ' t67 Perhaps because of this weak
support, only one attempted criminal prosecution for violation of the Law
has been reported.' 68 The defendant was found not guilty because the
court construed the penal provision of the statute strictly. The court's
demand for a clear showing of an " 'intent and purpose of violating' the
Sunshine Law,"'169 was proper judicial interpretation of the requirements
for imposing criminal penalties. This result should assuage the commen-
tators who fear the consequences of strict construction of the penal
provision. 170
The Pennsylvania Sunshine Law provides for a fine of one hundred
dollars plus costs.' 71 Another possible sanction with merit is removal
from his position of any official guilty of intentionally obstructing public
access to meetings or otherwise intentionally violating the Sunshine
165. This remains one of the most difficult aspects of enforcement of any open meeting
legislation. It is not until someone is personally affected by a closed meeting that unlawful
conduct of the meeting is questioned. Although very inefficient and time consuming, this is
the only way that actions of agencies will be examined and searches made to determine what
occurred at these meetings.
166. See, e.g., Annot., 38 A.L.R. 3d 1070, 1091-92 (1971); Wickham, supra note 14, at
496; Comment, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 536, supra note 34, at 553. See also Lawrence, supra
note 41, at 817-18; Mathew, supra note 40, at 548; Shurtz, supra note 54, at 464; Note, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1199, supra note 2, at 1211 (courts should strictly construe only criminal
provisions); 49 TEX. L. REv. 764, 772-74 (1971).
167. 1973 PA. H.R.J. 1836 (remark of Representative Miller). Some concern was also
expressed that political opponents would bring unwarranted charges as harrassment, but
this has not occurred. Id. at 1837 (remarks by Representative Dorr).
168. Commonwealth v. Harkins, 58 Erie 186 (Pa. C.P. 1975).
169. Id. at 187.
170. Note, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199, supra note 2, at 1211; Comment, 124 U. PA. L.
REV. 536, supra note 34, at 549-50.
171. Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 268 (Purdon Supp. 1977):
Any member of any agency who participates in a meeting or hearing knowing that it
is being held or conducted in such a way to intentionally prevent an interested party
from attending or with the intent and purpose of violating this act is guilty of a
summary offense and upon conviction thereof shall be sentenced to pay a fine not
exceeding one hundred dollars ($100) plus costs of prosecution.
Law. 172 The uproar that this might provoke can easily be countered by
noting that prosecution is difficult and that the prosecuting party must
establish a truly blatant intentional exclusion of the public from meetings
that the official knows should be open. If that truly blatant intent is found,
the official should be dismissed.
2. Invalidation of Actions taken at Meetings Violating the Law.-
Before the enactment of the Sunshine Law, courts used due process
notions of notice and opportunity to be heard to invalidate the results of
closed meetings. 173 Today invalidation is one of the remedies most
commonly drafted by lawmakers seeking to enforce their legislation. 174 It
may also be the most effective remedy. Some commentators, however,
fear that the invalidation remedy "could serve to limit the scope of the
Act's open meeting provisions themselves as the courts strain to find
agency actions valid . ... 175
One threatened outgrowth of this remedy was that when a decision
was made in violation of the Sunshine Law, the courts declared,
[The action is] void and of no effect as having been arrived at,
entered and communicated to the parties in the course of some
proceeding other than a public meeting. Therefore, the decision
being void and of no effect, the Board must be deemed to have
taken no action on the application of appellant and, therefore,
under the provisions of Section 908(9) of the Municipalities
Planning Code, appellant's application must be deemed to be
approved. 176
Fortunately, this result has been rejected by the commonwealth court and
the agency must start to reconsider the matter in public session. 
177
172. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.705 subd. 2 (West 1977). See also Wickham, supra
note 14, at 498-99.
173. See, e.g., Bradley v. Radnor Twp., 51 Pa. D. & C.2d 160,165 (C.P. Del 1971) (lack
of legal notice of a meeting violated due process and rendered an ordinance passed at that
meeting illegal, null, and void); Chester County Bk. v. East Whiteland Twp., 10 Chest. 454,
462-63, 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 384, 396 (C.P. 1962).
174. See Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 262 (Purdon Supp.
1977): "No formal action shall be valid unless such formal action is taken during a public
meeting." See also Comment, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151, supra note 18, at 1180-82; Comment,
Invalidation as a Remedy for Open Meeting Law Violations, 55 ORE. L. REv. 519 (1976).
Although invalidation has become one of the most common remedies for enforcement,
it has been continuously subjected to the courts' criticism and scrutiny because of its
severity and potential abuse. See Wilmington Fed'n of Teachers v. Howell, 374 A.2d 832,
835-36 (Del. 1977).
One restriction that some states use to limit a remedy as potentially volatile as invalida-
tion is to impose a statute of limitations on the time in which an action can be brought. See,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3301(a) (1975) (90 days); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30A, § 1 B
post (Supp. 1977-78) (14 days); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-15 (West 1976) (45 days).
175. Comment, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 536, supra note 34, at 559. This fear need not be
realized if the Pennsylvania courts observe the evolution of judicial discretion demonstrated
in New Jersey decisions on invalidation. Wickham, supra note 14, at 494-95. In its interpre-
tation of Judge v. Pocius, however, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court may have
already fallen into these dangers. See notes 78-84 and accompanying text supra.
176. Patwardham v. Bedminster Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 29 Bucks 36, 38 (Pa. C.P.
1976). The Municipalities Planning Code § 908(9) provides that failure of a local zoning
board to act on an application results in the approval of that application.
177. In re Emmanuel Baptist Church, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 427, 437-38, 364 A.2d 536,
541-42 (1976); Enck v. Anderson, 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 318,321-22,360 A.2d 802, 804 (1976).
3. Injunction and Mandamus Relief .- The third remedy to ensure
proper enforcement of the Sunshine Law is the equitable relief of injunc-
tion or mandamus. 178 In the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court case
applying the injunction remedy, Brutto v. Cianfrani,17 9 the relief prayed
for and granted was to open the General Assembly's Conference Commit-
tee on the General Appropriations bill. 80 This remedy will not be granted
without both a prior violation of the law and some indication that the
violation will be reported. 18'
4. Other Remedies-Declaratory Judgment, Civil Damages, At-
torney's Fees.-Another remedy specifically provided in the Pennsylva-
nia Sunshine Law is declaratory judgment. 8 2 The invalidation remedy is
applied through this device, but courts can go further and declare that a
meeting or type of meeting violates the Law. The remedies used with
declaratory judgment will depend on the pleadings and the court, but it is,
in itself, an important means of establishing guidelines for the types of
meetings that violate the Law. Violating the Sunshine Law in the face of a
prior declaratory judgment that the type of meeting held is a violation
could be presumptive evidence of the scienter necessary for criminal
sanctions. 
83
Civil damages should be granted to any person who has been
damaged by an agency action that violates the Law. Mere invalidation
may not be enough to place the complainant in his previous position.
Although the standing requirement may be more rigidly examined in a
claim for civil damages than in actions for injunctions or invalidation, the
prerequisites should be little different than those required in Board of
Commissioners of O'Hara v. Hakim. I1 4
178. Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 269 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
179. No. 1385 C.D. 1977 (Pa. Commw. Ct., filed July 15, 1977).
180. Id. at 1 & 6. The petitioners also sought declaratory judgment.
No Pennsylvania cases have been reported in which the court found that the prior
action violated the Law and enjoined all subsequent similar action. It is not possible,
therefore, to know if the problems other jurisdictions have experienced in obtaining general
injunctions will arise in Pennsylvania. It is possible, however, that this lack of cases granting
general injunctions may indicate judicial opposition to them. See also Dobrovolny v.
Reinhardt, 173 N.W.2d 837 (Iowa 1969), noted in 58 IOWA L. REV. 210 (1972). The Iowa
Supreme Court said, "Rights already lost and wrongs already committed are not subject to
injunctive relief, especially when there is no showing the wrong will be repeated." 173
N.W.2d at 841. By not allowing general injunctive relief, the Iowa court eliminated all
means of enforcing the Iowa statute, which provided for no other remedies.
181. See Note, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199, supra note 2, at 1215. Although injunctive relief
is traditionally equitable, here it is legal. The requirements of irreparable damage and no
other available legal remedy are not applied.
182. Pennsylvania Sunshine Law, PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 65, § 269 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
183. If the court in a case for civil damages does not find standing but finds a violation
of the Law, it can so declare although denying the relief sought. If a criminal action is
brought against the agency members for violating the Law at a later time, but in the same
manner, however, the earlier declaratory judgment could be used as evidence of their
scienter.
184. 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 661, 339 A.2d 905 (1975). See notes 152-61 and accompanying
text supra.
One of the most appropriate remedies is to have the agency against
whom a successful claim has been brought pay the complainant's attor-
ney's fees. i85 Although an award of fees to the opposition "is only done
under the rarest of circumstances,"' 8 6 strong policy and decisional law
support the contention that this should be such a circumstance. The
commonwealth court has recently ruled that when a party to litigation
benefits a great number of people by the private enforcement of a
statutory violation, the party is acting as a private attorney general in
effectuating both the public policy and legislative intent of the statute.
That party should be entitled to collect his expenses, including attorney's
fees, from the opposing party.187 The rTolicy basis for this remedy is that
the petitioner brought the action on behalf of all of the citizens of the
jurisdiction and the award of his attorney's fees from the agency's
treasury comes from the taxpayers' money. The people who benefit from
the action, therefore, pay for it.18
The decisions of the courts to adopt these or any other remedies or
interpretations of the Sunshine Law depend on the courts' construction of
the statutory language. In 1972 the Pennsylvania General Assembly
passed an act codifying many of the previously common-law rules of
statutory construction. 189 This Statutory Construction Act and the judicial
interpretation and application of it have been the basis of much of the
difficulty in properly implementing the Sunshine Law.
IV. Statutory Construction Rules Applied to the Pennsylvania
Sunshine Law
A. Liberal Interpretation of the Law
One commentator recently expressed concern that a criminal provi-
sion in the Sunshine Law might cause the courts to construe the entire
185. Comment, 1975 ARIz. ST. LJ. 111, supra note 2, at 131.
186. Feist v. Luzerne County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 181,
194, 347 A.2d 772, 780 (1975).
187. Id. at 195-96, 347 A.2d at 781. The basis for the Feist holding was a federal district
court case, La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The federal court set
forth three types of cases in which attorney's fees are allowed. The third one applies here:
"3) The 'private attorney general' situation. Here the courts use their power offensively
when necessary and appropriate to insure the effectuation of a strong [legislative] policy."
Id. at 96. See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970).
188. 396 U.S. at 396-97. But see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240 (1975), revg sub nom. Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir.
1974). The Supreme Court ruled that because of provision for attorney's fees in certain
instances, Congress implied that, when there was no statutory basis for the award, the
courts should not award such fees. This decision was specifically limited to federal courts.
Id. at 269. With judicious care in establishing standards that would comport with the
Supreme Court guidelines for awarding attorney's fees, id. at 263-64, state courts may
continue to award the fees as part of their equitable powers. See Serrano v. Priest, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303 (1977).
189. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1239, No. 290, (codified at 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1501-1504, 1701-1704, 1901-1910, 1921-1939, 1951-1957, 1961-1963, 1971-1978, 1991 (Pur-
don Supp. 1977)).
Law strictly and defeat its purpose. 190 The courts' subsequent holdings
have discounted this concern. 91 There has been a long, undeviating line
of Pennsylvania cases holding that a statute with a provision imposing
penal sanctions on transgressors will be liberally construed despite the
penal provision. This provision, however, will be subject to strict
construction. 192 The rule was among those codified in 1972193 and has
been continually accepted by the courts. 194
Florida's efforts toward liberal application of its sunshine law have
been cited many times in the briefs of complaining parties litigating
aspects of the Pennsylvania Sunshine Law. 195 Use of these cases and their
arguments has been based on both the widespread notoriety of the Florida
enactment and the similarity between some of its provisions and policies
and those of the Pennsylvania Law.'96 Critics of the Pennsylvania Sun-
shine Law who try to avoid dealing with the Florida cases cite excerpts
from the comments of legislators engaged in passage of the bill. 197 These
excerpts have been very misleading and out of context. Representative
Knepper in his remark that "this is not the Florida Sunshine Bill" was
commenting about the total inclusiveness of the Florida act and the need
for confidentiality in certain specific subject areas in which it was de-
nied.' 98 Representative Wise, another leading proponent of the bill,
declared, "There is one thing this bill is not, . . . it is not the Florida
'sunshine' law. . .. ,, 1Representative Wise, however, was comment-
ing about Representative Kistler's remarks that if there were no strong
sanctions to curtail unruly public participation and outbreaks, the effec-
tiveness of the agencies would be destroyed. 2° Representative Kistler
was implying that without appropriate means to shut off public participa-
190. Comment, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 536, supra note 34, at 552-53.
191. See, e.g., Laman v. McCord, 145 Ark. 401,404,432 S.W.2d 753, 755 (1968); Board
of Pub. Inst. v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969). Both cases show that when a statute
contains a penal provision, the courts will construe that provision strictly, but will construe
the remainder of the statute in accordance with its purpose.
192. See Commercial Banking Corp. v. Freeman, 353 Pa. 563, 567, 46 A.2d 233, 235
(1946); Commonwealth v. Shaleen, 215 Pa. 595, 597, 64 A. 797, 798 (1906); Commonwealth
v. Yaste, 166 Pa. Super. Ct. 275, 277, 70 A.2d 685, 687 (1950).
193. 1 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 1928(b)(1) & 1928(c) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
194. Consumers Educ. & Pro. Ass'n v. Nolan, 470 Pa. 372, 386, 368 A.2d 675, 682
(1977); Commonwealth v. Monumental Prop., Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 460-61, 329 A.2d 812, 817
(1974). But see Paterra v. Charleroi Area School Dist., 55 Wash. 115, 124 (Pa. C.P. 1975),
in which the court stated, "Since there is a penal provision in the Sunshine Law, we must
construe it strictly." This ambiguous language (to what does "it" refer?) could be inter-
preted as meaning the court will construe the entire statute strictly. But the approach the
court takes in dealing with the case indicates a disposition toward a liberal construction of
the statute, and "it" probably refers to "penal provision."
195. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant & Amicus Curiae Brief for Appellant, Judge v.
Pocius, 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 139, 367 A.2d 788 (1977).
196. In re Emmanuel Baptist Church, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 427, 432-35, 364 A.2d 536,
539-40 (1976).
197. Comment, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 536, supra note 34, at 546-47 n.74.
198. 1973 PA. H.R.J. 1839. See also note 77 and accompanying text supra.
199. 1973 PA. H.R.J. 1924.
200. Id. at 1923.
tion, the Pennsylvania bill would resemble the Florida law. 20 ' In response
to this attack, Representative Wise, like Representative Knepper, noted
the total coverage resulting from the Florida judiciary's interpretation of
its act and concluded that it was the total coverage of the Florida statute
that was distinguishable from the Pennsylvania bill. He intended that only
those meetings naturally resulting in a vote or policy decision be covered
and not the conversations of two men riding together in a car.
202
The Pennsylvania courts, however, have decided not only that they
should not look to Florida's statute for guidance, but also that they should
not consider the Florida courts' interpretations because they are not
controlling or applicable in Pennsylvania.20 3 This is inconsistent with the
general policy that courts look to other jurisdictions, statutes, and judicial
interpretations to deal with novel concepts. 20 4 It also conflicts with the
1976 commonwealth court decision, In re Emmanuel Baptist Church .205
The court in Emmanuel Baptist Church referred to the Florida Sunshine
Law, the Florida Courts' interpretations, Florida legal periodicals ex-
plaining the law, and other periodicals discussing the responses of their
jurisdictions to open meeting legislation.206 The court selected its holding
and then sought legal support. The court, however, rejects that same legal
authority when it conflicts with a holding it has chosen in a different case.
B. The Sunshine Law is in Pari Materia with the Right to Know and
Open Meetings Laws
The Pennsylvania courts had little difficulty in deciding that the
Sunshine Law is in pari materia with the Right to Know and Open
Meetings Laws. 207 They have even recognized that the new Law "ex-
pands" upon the former laws that required "essential governmental
functions to render their decisions at public meetings." 20 8 The courts had
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1924. The text reference to "naturally resulting in a vote or policy decision"
means that Representative Wise did not intend to allow agencies to hold their decision-
making sessions elsewhere and come back and quickly condtrtt a formal vote. The definition
of "formal" action should not be accepted as definitive, but should be viewed as descriptive
of the types of meetings that should be open. Those meetings at which a formal action could
naturally be taken must be open.
203. Judge v. Pocius, 77 Lack. 19, 24-25 (Pa. C.P. 1976), aff'd, 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 139,
367 A.2d 788 (1977).
204. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Monumental Prop., Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 461-66, 329
A.2d 812, 817-20 (1974) (examines similar federal law).
205. 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 427, 364 A.2d 536 (1976).
206. Id. at 432-35, 364 A.2d at 539-40.
207. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court explained the Sunshine Law as "the
latest in a series of legislative enactments designed to provide a comprehensive format
governing public access to the meetings and hearings of public agencies." Judge v. Pocius,
28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 139, 142, 367 A.2d 788, 790 (1977) (footnotes omitted). The omitted
footnotes referred to the 1957 Right to Know and Open Meeting Laws.
The court in Judge at the trial level also admitted that the laws cover the same subject
areas. 77 Lack. 19, 24 (Pa. C.P. 1976). See I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1932(a) (Purdon Supp.
1977) ("Statutes or parts of statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same persons
or things or to the same class of persons or things").
208. In re Emmanuel Baptist Church, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 427, 432, 364 A.2d 536, 539
made a constant effort to construe the 1957 laws liberally to achieve the
obvious legislative goals. 209 It is also well established in Pennsylvania
that an enlarging statute amending existing law should be construed
liberally to reach the apparent (or obvious) legislative objective.210 Simi-
larly, acts in pari materia should be construed together as one statute.
2 1
1
Despite this history, the Pennsylvania courts, in dealing with the Sun-
shine Law, have often used strict construction of a single phrase of the
statute21 2 and disregarded other determinations of intent, liberal construc-
tion, and precedent.
213
Legislative regard of the relationship between the old laws and the
Sunshine Law is clear from the floor debates. Representative Knepper
remarked that the bill was intended to put more teeth in the old law. 21 4 Of
even greater importance is the debate about an amendment Representative
Butera sought to introduce to limit severely the bill's coverage by exclud-
ing any agency already covered by an existing law requiring openness.
215
The immediate and outraged responses of the bill's proponents are ample
evidence that this was not what the legislature intended.2 16 They all
declared that the bill went beyond existing law and opened already open
meetings even further. They demanded rejection of the amendment and
acceptance of full disclosure of agency meetings. They did not wish that
merely the final votes would be made available to the public in an open
meeting, but wanted to open the entire meeting.2" 7 The amendment was
handily defeated.
218
Although it spoke only of the Florida legislature and its Sunshine
Law, the Florida Supreme Court could easily have been speaking of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in Times Publishing Co. v. Williams :219
Clearly the legislature must have intended to include more than
the mere affirmative formal act of voting on an issue or the
(1976). This case supports the rules of construction advising the courts to take into account
"[t]he former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects." I PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c)(5) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
209. See. e.g., Shapp v. Butera, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 229, 238,348 A.2d 910,915 (1975).
The commonwealth court specifically considered the statutory purpose of the law before it
decided how to construe one of the terms of the statute.
210. See Bolton v. King, 105 Pa. 78, 83 (1884); Sheetz v. Hanbest's Ex'rs, 81 Pa. 100,
102 (1876).
211. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1932(b) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
212. Judge v. Pocius, 28 Pa. Coummw. Ct. 139, 142-45, 367 A.2d 788,790-91 (1977). But
see notes 78-80 and accompanying text supra.
213. See notes 227-35 and accompanying text infra. See also Amicus Curiae Brief for
Appellant, Judge v. Pocius, 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 139, 367 A.2d 788 (1977). "By reading
together the Sunshine Law, Right to Know Law and Open Meeting Law, it is apparent that
the all-embracing language of the Sunshine Law was intended to fill existing gaps to public
information, and should be read to achieve that purpose." Id. at 25.
214. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
215. 1973 PA. H.R.J. 1917.
216. See id. (remarks of Representative Rappaport); id. at 1918 (remarks of Represen-
tative Shane); id. (remarks of Representative Schmitt); id. at 1919 (remarks of Representa-
tive Ritter).
217. See generally id. at 1917-21.
218. Id. at 1921. The vote for the amendment was 66 in favor and 125 opposed.
219, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1969).
formal execution of an official document. These latter acts are
indeed 'formal,' but they are matters of record and easily ascer-
tainable (though perhaps ex post facto), notwithstanding such
legislation; and indeed the public has always been aware sooner
or later of how its officials voted on a matter, or of when and
how a document was executed. Thus, there would be no real
need for the act if this was all the framers were talking about. It
is also how and why the officials decided to so act which
interest the public.
20
C. Remedial Statutes must be Construed to Give Effect to their
Remedies
Both the Right to Know and the Sunshine Laws are remedial stat-
utes. The legislature provided the public with a right and a remedy that it
did not have at common law. 22' The goal of courts in construing a
remedial statute should be to apply the remedy whenever possible. This
was the rule as reported in Blackstone's Commentaries, 222 and it is the
rule today. 223 Courts have also repeatedly held that they must interpret a
statute to remedy the evils it is designed to eliminate. 224 A final rule is
that when the courts deal with a law affecting public interest, " 'an
interpretation is preferred which favors the public . ... , "225
The recent judicial construction of the Pennsylvania Sunshine Law
in Judge v. Pocius226 denies the public the remedy the legislature pro-
vided. It allows the evils of both closed-door decision-making and secret
agreements to persist between agency members. Finally, Judge protects
the private interest of school board members at the cost of the public's
interest in discerning what those members regard as important criteria in
their decisionmaking.
220. Id. at 473-74 (emphasis in original). But see Brief for Appellee, Judge v. Pocius, 28
Pa. Commw. Ct. 139, 367 A.2-d 788 (1977). The schooI board counsel correctly stated that a
strict interpretation of the formal action requirement for open meetings makes the new law
even more restrictive than the previous law. Id. at 18. Certainly this is in direct opposition to
what the legislature intended. See notes 37-38, 68,198-202, & 214-18 and accompanying text
supra.
221. See Orlosky v. Haskell, 304 Pa. 57, 155 A. 112 (1931). "[W]hen an act is remedial
it will be construed so as to give to the words used in it the largest, fullest and most extensive
meaning to which they are reasonably susceptible. ... Id. at 62, 155 A. at 113.
222. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *87.
223. See, e.g., Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. v. Hartlieb, 465 Pa. 249, 254, 348 A.2d
746, 748-49 (1975) (act construed to favor the injured employee); Commonwealth v. Monu-
mental Prop., Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 460, 329 A.2d 812, 817 (1974) (act construed to prevent
unfair or deceptive trade practices).
224. See In re Wilhelm, 104 Pa. Super. Ct. 479, 482, 159 A. 49, 50 (1932). The evil in
question was illegal behavior of one seeking to run for election to a public office.
The Rules of Statutory Construction declare that, in interpreting a statute, a court may
ascertain the General Assembly's intentions by "[t]he occasion and necessity for the
statute", I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(c)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1977), and by "[t]he mischief
to be remedied." Id. § 1921(c)(3).
225. City of Phila. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 280, 289-90,
303 A.2d 247, 252 (1973) (citing Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 345 Pa. 244, 250,
26 A.2d 909, 912 (1942)).
See also I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1922(5) (Purdon Supp. 1977). There is a presumption
that "the General Assembly intends to favor the public interest as against any private
interest. "
226. 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 139, 367 A.2d 788 (1977).
D. Other Applicable Rules of Construction
"When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity,
the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its
spirit." 22 7 This codified rule of statutory construction is the basis for the
Pennsylvania courts' decisions restricting coverage of the Sunshine Law
to meetings at which a vote is taken or policy decided.228 If the courts had
used this rule to justify strict construction of a statute that is indeed
explicit, no complaint could be raised about their interpretation. But
numerous complaints have arisen from all levels of the judicial system
that the Pennsylvania Sunshine Law is not explicit. 229 The rule, there-
fore, should not be applied.
A corollary of the rule of explicit statutes is that courts may not add
language that the legislature has not deemed appropriate. 230 This was
explicitly part of the courts' reasoning in Judge, in which the court
decided that it could not add language in its interpretation of the Sunshine
Law. The legislature, however, did not find this rule of construction
appropriate for codification in 1972. In contrast, section 1923(c) of the
Rules of Statutory Construction provides, "Words and phrases which
may be necessary to the proper interpretation of a statute and which do
not conflict with its obvious purpose and intent, nor in any way affect its
scope and operation, may be added in the construction thereof.''231
The courts' definition and interpretation of specific phrases, without
regard to other provisions of the Law, conflict with other rules of
statutory construction. Two of these rules are similar but are separately
codified: "Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to
all its provisions" 232 and "the General Assembly intends the entire
227. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(b) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
228. The trial court in Judge v. Pocius cited this provision, 77 Lack. 19, 25 (Pa. C.P.
1976), and the commonwealth court, in affirming the lower court's holding, implicitly relied
on it.
229. See, e.g., In re Emmanuel Baptist Church, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 427, 431,364 A.2d
536, 538 (1976) (the Sunshine Law is "a statute which fails to establish precise guidelines for
operational compliance"); Paterra v. Charleroi Area School Dist., 55 Wash. 115, 120 (Pa.
C.P. 1975) (the Law is "no model of legislative draftsmanship"); Amicus Curiae Brief for
Appellant at 8, Judge v. Pocius, 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. 139, 367 A.2d 788 (1977) (the Law has
been "charged as being imprecise and susceptible to a multitude of inconsistent construc-
tions"); Comment, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 536, supra note 34, at 540 (the Law is most
"inartfully drawn"). Even the court in Judge felt the need to "interpret" the definition of
"formal action." 28 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 144-45, 367 A.2d at 791.
The Law is not explicit, even after full consideration of the warning to disallow the use
of extrinsic facts or construction to create any ambiguity or uncertainty. Workmen's Comp.
Appeal Bd. v. Hartlieb, 465 Pa. 249, 254, 348 A.2d 746, 749 (1975).
230. See Daugherty v. Continental Can Co., Inc., 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 342, 348, 313 A.2d
276, 279 (1973); Schaefer v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 349, 354, 318 A.2d 365, 368
(1974).
231. 1 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1923(c) (Purdon Supp. 1977) (emphasis added). Any
argument that additional language affects the scope and operation of a statute can be met
with the observation that it only affects the scope and operation to the extent necessary to
interpret the statute as it clearly should be construed-according to the legislative purpose
and intent.
232. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977).
statute to be effective and certain. ' 233 These rules should be read in
conjunction with another that provides, "[T]he General Assembly does
not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreason-
able. "234 They indicate that an interpretation of the Sunshine Law permit-
ting the entire decision-making process to occur out of public sight and
allowing public access to only the final vote is incorrect. The avowed
purpose and design of the Law is to open more meetings than were
previously open and to open wider those meetings that had already been
open.235 Clearly this purpose is absurd, unreasonable, and impossible if
the courts interpret the Law as requiring even less openness than was
allowed before its enactment. Such a construction should, therefore, be
avoided.
V. Conclusion
Although there will be few agency or department members who will
admit that they continue to conduct their business and decision-making
behind closed doors, this problem persists. In the course of the passage of
the Sunshine Law, Senator Coppersmith voiced the public's cynicism that
secretive meetings will continue.236 Some previously secret meetings,
however, have been opened. Circumstantial evidence of possible wheel-
ing and dealing at meetings and the participants' reluctance to have the
public privy to such proceedings may be found in the sudden departure
from Harrisburg of members of the Conference Committee on the Gener-
al Appropriations Bill as soon as their meetings were opened to the bright
light of "Sunshine. "237 It is an old and still accepted maxim of legal
evidence that proof of flight is relevant to establish a wrongdoing.
238
Whatever the shortcomings of the existing law, therefore, it does open
meetings, and each newly opened meeting benefits the public.
The legislative floor debates reveal the legislature's intent in enact-
ing the Sunshine Law.239 Unfortunately, in the process of its legislative
journey, the bill was dissected, amended, and weakened. 2' The blame
for the courts' difficulty, therefore, lies with the legislature. The legisla-
233. Id. § 1922(2).
234. Id. § 1922(1).
235. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
236. -[Board members] will not meet together and they will discuss this willy-nilly, and
the public will, instead of being served better, get a much worse type of governmental
action." 1974 PA. SEN. J. 2099.
237. Harrisburg Patriot, July 16, 1977, at 1, col. I.
238. Commonwealth v. Liebowitz, 143 Pa. Super. Ct. 75, 83, 17 A.2d 719, 722-23
(1941). See also Proverbs 28:1, "The wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous
are bold as a lion."
239. Legislative intent in enacting a statute must be the "polestar for construction" of
that statute. In re Neshaminy Auto Villa Ltd., 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 129, 133, 358 A.2d 433,
435 (1976). See also I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1921(a) & 1921(c) (Purdon Supp. 1977)
(requiring that the courts consider the legislative intent).
240. See 1973 PA. H.R.J. 2071 (remarks by Representative Knepper) ("I think the bill
has been compromised and diluted much more than those of us who are the sponsors would
like to have seen it diluted").
ture implemented two different concepts for allowing closed meetings,
2 4 1
it omitted a section on legislative purpose that would specifically require
liberal constructions, 242 and it has failed to enact amendments to alleviate
these problems.2 43 But the Law was passed with its faults.
The blame must now be shared by any Pennsylvania court that
refuses to consider the purposes, intent, and policy of, the legislature. No
clear reason exists for the courts' reluctance to properly enforce the Law
despite its faults. Earlier comments that the principal enforcement mecha-
nism must be public opinion aroused by the media miss the mark.
244
Without conscientious efforts by the courts to prevent blatant "re-run"
meetings at which formal votes are held and to implement the full public
policy inherent in any Sunshine Law, there will be no open government in
Pennsylvania.
RICHARD E. FEHLING
241. See notes 69-77 and accompanying text supra.
242. See generally Comment, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151 (1974), supra note 18, at 1162-63.
243. See Pa. H. 361 & 1374, Session of 1977. The text of the two bills is nearly
identical. Bill 361 is the legislative response to the current interpretation of the Sunshine
Law. Representative Knepper, the prime sponsor of the Sunshine Law, is also the prime
sponsor of this bill to amend the Law.
244. Comment, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 536, supra note 34, at 560.
